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THE RIGHT TO DISCLOSURE OF NLRB
DOCUMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT
I. Introduction
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)' makes it possible,
within limitations, for the public to obtain disclosure of government
documents. The purpose of the statute is to prevent the accumula-
tion of a body of secret law;' however, some federal agencies contend
that parties to agency proceedings have utilized this statute to ob-
tain pre-hearing discovery.3
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has been especially
affected by requests of this nature.4 This Note will briefly analyze
FOIA, particularly as it applies to the NLRB. A balance between
the agency's needs for secrecy and parties' rights to know will be
suggested.
I. The Freedom of Information Act
A primary purpose of FOIA is to make disclosure of federal agency
information the rule and to make secrecy the exception.' Agency
procedures, statements of general policy, and other items of interest
to the general public are available under the law.' Parties to agency
proceedings, however, are primarily interested in materials listed in
section 552(a)(2).7 That section commands disclosure of orders, final
opinions' and other similar items which carry the weight of legal
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974)[hereinafter cited as FOIA].
2. Senator Dirksen summed up the need to prevent promulgation of laws known only to
the promulgators as follows:
IFairl and just administrative proceedings require, first of all, that the people know
not only what the statutory law is, but what the administrative rules and regulations
are, where to go, who to see, what is required and how they must present their matter.
They must be informed in advance about the decisions which the administrative
agencies and departments may use as precedent in determining their matter and
whether these decisions were unanimous or divided ....
110 CONG. REC. 17088 (1964) (remarks of Senator Dirksen).
3. See cases cited in notes 45-47 infra.
4. Id.
5. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1973).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970).
7. Id. § 552(a)(2), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
8. Id. § 552(a)(2)(A).
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precedent in agency adjudication.' The law prohibits agency use of
such material against another party unless the material has been
indexed or made available, or the party has notice thereof.'0 Ideally,
no agency should be permitted to prevail in a proceeding merely
because it has access to material of precedential value which is
unavailable to its opponent.
Through FOIA, Congress intended to give the public the broadest
possible access to government documents and processes." However,
as President Lyndon B. Johnson realized, "the welfare of the Nation
or the rights of individuals may require that some documents not
be made available."' 2 As a result, Congress passed section 552(b),' 3
which creates nine categories of materials exempt from disclosure.
In the context of NLRB proceedings, the fifth 4 and seventh 5 ex-
emptions have become the most important.
Exemption 5 covers inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda and
letters. It exempts from discovery "attorney-work product" and
intra-agency advisory opinions (sometimes called "executive privi-
lege").' 7 Exemption 7 protects investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes.'" Prior to the 1974 amendments, an agency
could, and often did, thwart FOIA by labelling a file "investigatory"
and placing a multitude of material in it." The amendments limited
the "investigatory" material classification to data which would
upon disclosure:"
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right
to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source
(E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger
the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel ....
9. Id. §§ 552(a)(2)(B)-(C).
10. Id. §§ 552(a)(2)(C)(i)-(ii).
11. See, e.g., 110 CoNG. REC. 17089 (1964).
12. SURCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SEN. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES,
AH'TCIES 195 (Comm. Print 1974) (remarks of President Johnson).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
14. Id. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
15. Id. § 552(b)(7), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
16. Id. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
17. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150-54 (1975).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
19. See 110 CON.. REC. 17088-89 (1964).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
NOTES
Under either exemption, an agency may not indiscriminately
classify material as protected from FOIA disclosure requirements.',
In instances where the privilege has been abused and the inspection
of documents has been wrongfully denied, federal district courts are
empowered to grant a mandatory injunction." This power, however,
should be subject to the usual provisions that all available adminis-
trative remedies have been exhausted and that irreparable harm
will result. 3
III. The NLRB and FOIA
A. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.: The Scope of Exemption 5
When an unfair labor practice is charged," the NLRB sends a
field examiner to investigate. 5 During the course of the investiga-
tion, the examiner may take statements from witnesses. 6 The ex-
aminer's findings, which are often in affidavit form, are next sub-
mitted to the regional director who decides whether a complaint
should issue."
The party who alleged the unfair labor practice may appeal a
decision of the regional director not to issue a complaint." The file
on the matter is sent to an appeals committee within the general
counsel's office." The regional director is bound by the committee's
decision which is set forth, with reasons, in a document called an
appeals memorandum.'
The regional director is required, or "permitted," to solicit the
general counsel's advice in several other instances.' In cases involv-
21. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973).
22. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
23. An injunction ordinarily will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates that he had
no adequate remedy at law (including administrative avenues to pursue), will suffer
irreparable harm without the injunction, and is likely to be successful at trial on the merits.
See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 2942-50
(1973).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1975). The investigation of an unfair labor practice is initiated by
filing a charge with the regional director. Id.
25. Id. § 101.4.
26. Id.
27. Id. §§ 101.4-6.
28. Id. §§ 101.6, 102.19, 102.81.
29. Id. §§ 102.19, 102.81.
30. Id. §§ 101.6, 102.19(c).
31. For further discussion of this problem, see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S.
132, 140 (1975).
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ing "novel, complex or doubtful issues,"32 an advice memorandum
will be issued.33 Despite its name, that memorandum is also a final
determination which binds the regional director to a given course of
action ."
In NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 35 plaintiff appellee sought ex-
amination of all appeals and advice memoranda which pertained to
certain matters of legitimate interest to the company. Plaintiff
claimed that the memoranda constituted section 552(a)(2)
material-"final opinions"-and that the Act mandated their dis-
closure. 3 Both the district court and the court of appeals agreed"
and ordered the Board to release all of the documents. The NLRB
appealed.
After receiving the case, the Supreme Court held,38
those Advice and Appeals Memoranda which explain decisions by the Gen-
eral Counsel not to file a complaint are "final opinions" . . . and fall outside
the scope of Exemption 5; but that those Advice and Appeals Memoranda
which explain decisions by the General Counsel to file a complaint and
commence litigation . . . are not "final opinions" . and do fall within the
scope of Exemption 5.
32. 1 NLRB CASPHANDLINC, MANUAL §§ 11750-56 (1975).
33. Id. §§ 11751.1(b)(1)-(13). "Novel, complex. or doubtful issues" include: (1) issues
concerning a union's duty of fair representation and/or union-caused employment discrimina-
tion for reasons of race, sex or other arbitrary considerations; (2) issues pertaining to union
internal discipline; and (3) issues involving jurisdiction. Id.
34. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.19(c) (1975). For a discussion of this procedure, see NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 141-42 (1975).
35. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
36. Id. at 142-43. Plaintiffs asked the NLRB for the memoranda issued within the previous
five years dealing with the subjects of the propriety of withdrawals by employers or unions
from multi-employer bargaining arrangements, disputes as to the commencement date of
negotiations, or conflicting interpretations in any context of the Board's rule in Retail Asso-
ciates, 120 NLRB 388 (1958). 421 U.S. at 142-43. Plaintiffs contended that they needed this
material since it was the only source of agency law on the issues. The general counsel replied
that advice memoranda are simply guides for the regional director and were not final
opinions. Further, the general counsel said that appeals memoranda which involved the filing
of a complaint were not final opinions and that appeals memoranda which did not result in
the filing of a complaint were several thousand in number and had no precedential signifi-
cance. As for the indices to the appeals memoranda, the general counsel alleged that such
memos were not indexed by subject matter and that he was "unable" to comply with plain-
tiffs' request. Id. at 143-44.
37. Id. at 143-44.
38. Id. at 146-47.
39. Id. at 148.
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Perhaps aware that these distinctions seemed contrary to the
spirit of FOIA, the Court stated that the ultimate purpose of exemp-
tion 5 was to "prevent injury to the quality of agency decisions.","
The deliberation processes of the agency had to be safeguarded;
however, no harm would result by compelling disclosure of decisions
finally reached. Therefore, "as long as prior communications and
the ingredients of the decision-making process are not disclosed, '""
the decision itself had to be made available for examination.
B. After Sears: Exemption 7 Cases
The Sears Court expressly declined to consider any claim under
exemption 7.42 Absent a Supreme Court decision concerning the
scope of that rule, some lower courts in post-Sears3 cases ordered
full disclosure" while other courts denied disclosure altogether. 5
This confusion has been ameliorated somewhat by the general ac-
ceptance" of the Second Circuit's decision in Title Guarantee Co.
v. NLRB. 7
In 1975 plaintiff Title Guarantee was charged with committing an
unfair labor practice by refusing to execute a collective bargaining
agreement.48 The NLRB issued a complaint after an investigation.'
Plaintiff then requested copies of all witness statements obtained
during the investigation. The regional director refused the request,
40. Id. at 151.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 162-65.
43. See, e.g., Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'g, 407 F.
Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
44. See, e.g., Maremont Corp. v. NLRB, 91 L.R.R.M. 2804 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Bel-
lingham Frozen Foods v. Henderson, 91 L.R.R.M. 2761 (W.D. Wash. 1976); Title Guarantee
Co. v. NLRB, 407 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976).
45. See, e.g., Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Local 30 v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB,
405 F. Supp. 1200 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976); Amerace Corp. v. NLRB, 91
L.R.R.M. 2344 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
46. See Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'g 407 F. Supp.
208 (D. Colo. 1975); Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.), rev'g 411 F.
Supp. 454 (D. Mass. 1976); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d. Cir.), afJ'g
405 F. Supp. 1200 (W.D. Pa. 1976). See Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698 (N.D.
I1. 1976).
47. 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976), revg 407 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
48. 407 F. Supp. 498, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
49. Id.
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asserting privilege from disclosure under FOIA exemptions.50 After
the general counsel sustained this ruling, Title Guarantee applied
for a mandatory injunction under FOIA in federal district court.'
Following in camera review 2 of the documents in issue, the court
ordered full disclosure, and pending compliance, enjoined further
proceedings before the NLRB.53 The court found that exemption
7(A), as amended in 1974, did not exempt disclosure of investigatory
files unless specific harm would result. The possibility that wit-
nesses would hesitate to come forward in the future was an insuffi-
cient basis to refuse disclosure.54
On appeal,55 the NLRB contended that the 1974 amendments did
not affect prior law regarding exemption 7(A). The Board argued
that statements compiled as part of an ongoing unfair labor practice
investigation were exempt under any interpretation of exemption
7.'1 The Second Circuit, after considering the legislative history of
the amendments, concluded the Board had sustained the burden of
proving that disclosure of witness statements would interfere with
enforcement proceedings. But the court declined to adopt a general
rule that any so-called investigative information would be "per se
nondisclosable."55 The court recognized the need for construing the
amended exemption narrowly to conform with congressional in-
tent.59
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. This procedure is specifically allowed by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
53. 407 F. Supp. at 508,
54. Id. at 504-05. The court also rejected the NLRB's contention that the disclosure would
result in an unwarranted invasion of privacy so as to fall under the section 7(C) exemption.
The court said that the type of information plaintiffs sought was not of the kind that would
warrant the invocation of this exemption. Id. at 505-06. For cases involving the use of the
exemption which allows for the concealment of material that would result in an unwarranted
invasion of privacy, see Wine Hobby USA v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974) (home address,
family status); Ditlow v. Schultz, 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974) (travel history). The Title
(harantee court also rejected the NLRB's argument that the disclosure of materials would
fall under the section 7(D) exemption allowing an agency to decline revelation of information
that was elicited after an express assurance of confidentiality. In this case, according to the
court, there was no evidence that the Board had so assured the witness it had interviewed.
407 F. Supp. at 505-06.
55. 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1976).
56. Id. at 490.
57. Id. at 491.
58. Id.
59. Id.
(Vol. V
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The Second Circuit also refused to accept,"0
the substantive effect . . . of appellee's disclosure contentions [which]
would be tantamount to the issuance of new, broader discovery rules for
NLRB proceedings ....
The court stated that the promulgation of discovery rules was com-
mitted to the NLRB,6' and found no indication in the FOIA legisla-
tive history that Congress intended to supersede or supplement such
rules. 2
The National Labor Relations Act" imposes no duty upon the
Board to adopt discovery procedures.64 The Board's policy of allow-
ing only limited discovery has been approved by courts dealing with
analagous issues involving other federal agencies. 5 The commonly
expressed justifications for narrow discovery are unassailably logical
-the possibility of intimidation of employees who are known to
have provided information; and the possibility that a charged party
could use "discovered" information to prepare a defense that would
thwart the proceeding and allow an unfair labor practice to go unre-
medied. 6
60. Id. at 487.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 491.
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
64. Title Guarantee v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir. 1976), citing NLRB v. Interboro
Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971).
Besides handling unfair labor practice cases, the NLRB is permitted under section 9 of the
National Labor Relations Act to regulate the selection or designation of employee representa-
tives for the purposes of collective bargaining as well as the determination of the appropriate
unit for bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970). However, the court in Title Guarantee said that
its decision was not to be applied broadly and not to cases involving other agencies. 534 F.2d
at 492. Several NLRB decisions have held that the Board need not disclose how it determined
that an employee organization showing of interest was valid and sufficient. See, e.g., Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1397 (1952); O.D. Jennings & Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 516 (1946).
65. See, e.g., Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502
F.2d 370, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 889 (1972).
66. In a speech entitled "The Right to Privacy and Freedom of Information: The NLRB
& Issues under the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act" [hereinafter cited as IRVING
SPEECHI, NLRB General Counsel John S. Irving gave another strong argument in favor of
limited discovery, based upon the "special" nature of NLRB proceedings. According to Irv-
ing, a major problem with discovery in any litigation is the delay inherent in formal discovery
procedures. Thus:
In the context of labor disputes, this factor is critical since undue delay subverts the
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
Furthermore, Congress designed the 1974 FOIA amendments to
tighten exemption 7, not to serve as a substitute for discovery legis-
lation." Thus, the Second Circuit stated: "8
In light of the delicate relationship. . . between employer and employee.
Congress would be very reluctant to change the rather carefully arrived at
limitations and procedures for discovery in unfair labor practice proceedings
by way of an act which, while dealing with disclosure generally, does not
purport to affect such discovery.
Since Title Guarantee, many courts have closely followed the
analysis of the Second Circuit.
In Roger J. Au & Son v. NLRB,69 the Third Circuit held that,
"statements of charging parties and potential witnesses in pending
enforcement proceedings are privileged under FOIA exemption
7(A)." ' 1 Plaintiff had sought copies of all written statements of
charging parties or possible witnesses in the Board's files, contend-
ing that the 1974 amendments of exemption 7 had enlarged the
scope of disclosure of investigative files.7 In essence, plaintiff
argued that all investigative files were to be made available "unless
there is an affirmative showing with respect to the particular mate-
rial in question of a harm specified in exemption 7."' The Third
Circuit disagreed:7"
[D]isclosure of statements by witnesses contained in the file of a pending
NLRB case . . . would "interfere with enforcement proceedings" as Congress
understood that concept when it enacted exemption 7(A).
Several district court cases decided after Title Guarantee also
have accepted the Second Circuit's conclusions regarding produc-
tion of witness statements.74 In Vegas Village Shopping Corp. v.
basic purpose of the National Labor Relations Act which is the elimination of in-
dustrial strife.
4 CCH LAn. RE. REP. 1 9082, at 15,206-12 (1976).
67. See Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1976).
68. Id. at 492.
69. Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.) affg 405 F. Supp. 1200 (W.D.
Pa. 1976).
70. 538 F.2d at 82.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 83.
74. See Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. I1. 1976); Gerico, Inc. v. NLRB,
92 L.R.R.M. 2713 (D. Colo. 1976); Pacific Photo Type, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2560 (D.
Hawaii 1976); Vegas Village Shopping Corp. v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 2683 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
[Vol. V
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NLRB, 5 the court declared that FOIA is not a discovery tool.7"
Similarly, in Gerico Inc. v. NLRB,77 the district court concluded,
"the purpose of FOIA is not to set procedural guidelines in adminis-
trative proceedings."7 All of the cases accepting the Title
Guarantee holding, cite Sears for the proposition that a charged
party's rights under FOIA,78
are neither increased nor decreased by reason of the fact that it claims an
interest in [the documents] greater than that shared by the average member
of the public. The Act is fundamentally designed to inform the public about
agency action and not to benefit private litigants [citations omitted].
Despite Title Guarantee and the cases which have adopted the
Second Circuit's reasoning, uniformity among courts has not yet
been reached. In Baptist Memorial Hospital v. NLRB, ° a district
court reluctantly applied exemption 7(D) to requested witness affi-
davits since the witness had received assurance of confidentiality."
Absent this fact, the court would have compelled disclosure because
it viewed such pre-trial discovery as "almost essential to get to the
true facts of any case and [a great aid] to enforcement proceed-
ings."82 In Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 3 a United States
District Court ordered disclosure of written statements of witnesses
who were certain to be called to testify. The court reasoned that the
Board would be required to produce the statements after testimony
was given; any deleterious effect of furnishing them beforehand
would be de minimus5 4 The rationale of this opinion, and the one
in Baptist Memorial, in effect gave parties to agency proceedings
greater access to information than the general public and thus di-
rectly contravened the Supreme Court's opinion in Sears.8"
75. 92 L.R.R.M. 2683 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
76. Id. at 2685.
77. 92 L.R.R.M. 2713 (D. Colo. 1976).
78. Id. at 2716.
79. 421 U.S. at 143 n.10.
80. 92 L.R.R.M. 2645 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2647-48.
83. 92 L.R.R.M. 2586 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
84. Id.
85. 421 U.S. 132 (1975). See also Furr's Cafeterias, Inc. v. NLRB, 416 F. Supp. 629 (N.D.
Tex. 1976). In that case, the court permitted the disclosure of affadavits of witnesses but not
the identity of such witnesses. Id. at 631.
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The best method of implementing FOIA while protecting exemp-
tion 7 interests is suggested in Gerico v. NLRB:6
While the expertise of the administrative agency in labor-management dis-
putes may be decisive in terms of breadth of pre-hearing disclosure, that
consideration is no longer relevant once the proceeding is terminated. On the
other hand, the thrust of FOIA is to enforce the people's "right to know",
which will be implemented just as effectively after the administrative hear-
ing as it would be if disclosure were to occur prior to the hearing.
If disclosure is postponed until after the administrative hearing
is concluded, no claim of interference with enforcement proceedings
could be sustained and the public's right to know is nonetheless
satisfied. The Board could delete names and other such identifying
data from disclosable materials whenever it has reason to anticipate
harassment after the fact."
The discovery process encourages delay, which is antithetical to
the federal labor policy of settling disputes and maintaining stable
employer-employee relations. If the Board observes the requirement
of due process, its narrow discovery procedures should be allowed
to stand, unaugmented by FOIA. 5
C. Injunctions
FOIA grants district courts jurisdiction to enjoin an agency from
withholding disclosable documents and to order their production.89
It is unclear, however, whether this injunctive power is in lieu of, or
in addition to, the courts' traditional equitable powers. Some dis-
trict courts have chosen the latter interpretation and have granted
injunctions against further proceedings pending disclosure of the
particular documents sought. Others have agreed with the NLRB's
86. 92 L.R.R.M. 2713, 2716 (D. Colo. 1976).
87. The court in Baptist Memorial Hospital suggested this procedure. See 92 L.R.R.M.
2645, 2647-48. (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
88. See, e.g., NLRB v. Valley Mold Co., 530 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1976). The Sixth Circuit
stated:
Since there is no specific provision in the [National Labor Relationsl Act for discovery
procedures, it is the responsibility of the Board, so long as it conforms to the require-
ments of due process, to formulate its own rules as to when discovery is available to a
party.
Id. at 695.
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(3) (1970), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
90. See, e.g., Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Capital Cities
Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Local 32 v. Irving, 92
I,.R.R.M. 2437 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
[Vol. V
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general counsel that injunction of agency proceedings is inappro-
priate?'
In Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., the Su-
preme Court declined to decide whether a district court could enjoin
agency proceedings until the agency complied with an order to pro-
duce particular documents. 3 Respondents had defense contracts
subject to renegotiation. Petitioner Renegotiation Board deter-
mined that excess profits had been realized, and respondents re-
quested the documents underlying that determination. The peti-
tioner eventually produced some of them, but withheld others as
exempt under FOIA. Respondents obtained an injunction against
the proceedings until the resolution of the disclosure dispute."
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that due to the unique nature
of the agency, contractors must pursue administrative remedies in
renegotiation cases." The Court said, "[sleeking injunctive relief
during the pendency of negotiation encourages delay through resort
to preliminary litigation over an FOIA claim."9
The "delay" argument utilized in Bannercraft should apply also
to the injunction of hearings before the NLRB. The NLRB's func-
tion is to settle labor disputes and remedy unfair labor practices
with a minimum of delay." By allowing Board proceedings to be
enjoined, courts encourage the use of pre-hearing FOIA suits as
dilatory tactics. Unfair labor practices might thus be allowed to
continue unremedied.
FOIA does not specifically withhold any powers from the courts
in suits brought under the statute, and courts may use their injunc-
tive powers when the situation warrants. Since no injunction will
issue unless certain standards are met,98 courts may manage to
avoid the FOIA problem simply by finding insufficient likelihood of
91. See, e.g., Goodfriend Western Corp. v. Fuchs, No. 76-116 (1st Cir., May 6, 1976), rev'g
91 L.R.R.M. 2454 (D. Mass. 1976); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 405 F. Supp. 1200 (W.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976). See IRVING SPEECH, supra note 66 at 15,210-11.
92. 415 U.S. i (1974). See 3 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 359 (1975).
93. 415 U.S. at 20.
94. Id. at 6-7.
95. Id. at 20.
96. Id. at 23.
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1970).
98. See WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 364-498.
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irreparable harm, or insufficient probability that plaintiff would
win at trial on the merits."
III. Conclusion
A party to a Board proceeding should not be denied access to
those opinions or rulings which are likely to act as precedent for the
Board's opinion in a case. Neither should a party obtain an advan-
tage by using FOIA as a tool of discovery, a purpose for which it was
never intended. There is a difference between final opinions or rul-
ings which establish legal policy, and a file filled with witness state-
ments comprising one side's case in court. A delicate balance exists
between employers and employees or their representatives, one
which should not be upset lightly. If Congress had intended to
broaden discovery in labor proceedings, it could have amended the
National Labor Relations Act, and made sure that the interests of
both sides were fully protected in accordance with established na-
tional labor policy.
FOIA is designed to satisfy the public's right to know. It does not
favor private over public litigants. Yet the current increase of
discovery-injunction decisions tips the balance in favor of parties to
agency proceedings. Courts should not allow this trend to continue.
99. See Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 412 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
[Vol. V
